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NOTE: This is the accepted version of the article published in the European Journal of Political 
Research. It has not been formatted or copy-edited for style. Some minor differences from the 
published version may be evident. 
 
How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in 
semi-presidential systems?  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi-presidential 
systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet 
yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In 
this article, the author argues that the president’s influence over government formation can be 
explained by their perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. 
In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president’s constitutional 
powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter 
government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their 
parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president’s party holds greater 
bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less 
uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using 
survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by 
the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining 
processes and contribute to the wider study of semi-presidentialism and executive-legislative 
relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president’s party affiliation is an 
important motivation for them as political actors, this contrasts with some previous studies 
which conceive of presidents as non-partisan actors. 
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The duration of the government formation process has potentially far-reaching consequences 
for the capacity of a state to address pressing policy concerns. No democratic state is ever 
without a government, but during bargaining over government formation a caretaker 
administration usually presides and by convention, this cabinet will not take controversial or 
partisan decisions since it is seen as lacking a mandate to do so. Extended periods of coalition 
bargaining can have significant consequences for a state. The governing crisis in Belgium 
between 2010 and 2011, which led to a government formation process that lasted 541 days, 
resulted in the legislature’s failure to pass a budget and, as consequently, an official rebuke from 
the European Commission.1 Furthermore, financial markets lost confidence in government 
bonds and interest rates rose markedly (Hooghe, 2012). It is therefore desirable that 
negotiations are concluded sooner rather than later. 
 
In recent years, several other European countries have experienced difficult periods of 
government formation. Following the December 2015 general election in Spain, coalition 
negotiations lasted more than four months with no resolution, resulting in new elections being 
called. These new elections did little to alter the situation but a new government eventually took 
office after four months of negotiations following the Socialists’ (PSOE) concession to tacitly 
support a minority Popular Party (PP) administration. By contrast, in October 2015 the 
Portuguese general election resulted in a fragmented legislature and fraught coalition 
negotiations yet government formation lasted just 53 days.2 So, why did government formation 
conclude much more rapidly in the Portuguese case?  
 
Part of the answer may lie in the constitutional arrangements of the respective states. Both 
Spain and Belgium are parliamentary systems while Portugal is semi-presidential. Although 
government formation can be prolonged in both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, 
extended bargaining periods are more common in parliamentary systems (see Figure 2). In this 
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article, I argue that the duration of government formation in semi-presidential systems will be 
shorter due to the president’s capacity and willingness to influence the process. 
 
Despite its importance, the study of the duration of government formation is in its infancy; just 
five articles have examined the causes of delays in coalition bargaining, all of which focus on 
either the complexity or uncertainty of the bargaining environment (De Winter & Dumont, 
2008; Diermeier & van Roozendaal, 1998; Ecker & Meyer, 2015; Golder, 2010; Martin & 
Vanberg, 2003). While the results of previous research in this field are inconsistent, none 
provide a systematic account of the role of extra-parliamentary actors in the government 
formation process, specifically, the influence of presidents in semi-presidential systems. As 
actors with a constitutionally designated role in the government formation process, and a more 
fuzzily-defined role in national politics more generally, presidents have the potential to 
influence the duration of coalition bargaining. The question is how and under which 
circumstances is this influence likely to be exercised? In this article, I set out a new theoretical 
contribution to the study of bargaining duration and contribute to the broader understanding of 
the power and influence of the president in semi-presidential systems. I argue that the 
president’s influence over the government formation process depends on two key factors: first, 
the president’s perceived legitimacy to act during coalition bargaining and second, the 
president's partisanship.  
 
In the first case, the electoral mandate provided by direct elections conveys a degree of 
legitimacy on the president to intervene in government formation compared to either 
indirectly-elected presidents or monarchs in parliamentary systems (Duverger, 1980). But 
possession of an electoral mandate is not sufficient to explain the president’s influence. Rather, 
the president’s legitimacy to act is conditional on the scale and scope of their constitutionally 
mandated powers which grant the office holder greater authority. This legitimacy to act allows 
the president to take greater initiative in the government formation process and in the post-
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formation legislative process. The effect of this is to reduce the number of potential governing 
proposals that are acceptable to politically relevant actors in the bargaining process. In the 
second case, assuming that the preferences of the president and their party overlap and the 
president has an interest in their party’s success (Grossman & Sauger, 2009), government 
formation is less complex when the president’s party in the legislature holds a stronger 
bargaining position. This means that the president’s party is pivotal to more potential governing 
proposals, and with all parties seeking to avoid potentially conflict-ridden periods of 
cohabitation, once more the range of acceptable governing proposals is reduced when the 
president’s party has greater bargaining power. Therefore, the duration of cabinet formation 
will be shorter. 
 
I test this theory using data from 26 European countries, 12 of which are classified as semi-
presidential under Elgie’s (1999) criteria. In doing so, I make three contributions to existing 
research; first, I provide a new theoretical explanation of presidential influence in the 
government formation process. Second, I demonstrate empirically the conditions under which 
presidents wield greater influence during government formation negotiations. Finally, the 
results presented in this paper contribute to the broader understanding of semi-presidential 
government by outlining how president’s use their formal powers to influence political 
outcomes. This paper also challenges the notion that presidents act in a non-partisan manner in 
semi-presidential systems which is often assumed in studies of semi-presidentialism (e.g. 
Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010). 
 
PRESIDENTS AND THE DURATION OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
 
The literature on the duration of government formation has primarily concentrated on the 
complexity and uncertainty of the bargaining process. Uncertainty in coalition bargaining is the 
lack of knowledge over the policy and office preferences of actors who need to agree to the 
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formation of the government. Complexity refers to the number of potential government 
proposals, which is effected by factors such as the number of parties in the legislature (Golder, 
2010). Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) find evidence that uncertainty caused by 
asymmetric information increases the duration of the government formation process while 
arguing that the complexity of the bargaining environment will have little effect. Martin and 
Vanberg (2003) and De Winter and Dumont (2008) disagree, demonstrating empirically that 
factors which increase the complexity of the bargaining environment (such as the number of 
parties and ideological polarization) also delay government formation. Golder (2010) shows 
that uncertainty always delays government formation but complexity only influences the 
duration of coalition negotiations when information uncertainty is high. Finally, Ecker and 
Meyer (2015) find few statistically significant effects in their models of the duration of coalition 
bargaining but conclude that these models work better in Western Europe than in the newer 
democracies of Eastern Europe. Institutions and rules – such as positive parliamentarism – have 
also been examined in the context of the effect that they have on the uncertainty or complexity 
of the bargaining environment. But presidents are both actors and holders of an institutional 
office and therefore, their role in government formation is one governed by the motivations of 
the actor and their capability (or willingness) to wield institutional powers. By considering both 
motivations and capability together, it is possible to conceive of the president’s impact on the 
duration of government formation more concretely. 
 
Empirically, it has been observed that the duration of government formation is shorter in semi-
presidential regimes but so far there has been no systematic account of why this may be the 
case – the authors of that study include semi-presidentialism as a control variable and note only 
the direction of the relationship (De Winter & Dumont, 2008). The more theoretically and 
substantively interesting questions are when and why are presidents influential? Answering 
these questions helps to inform our knowledge of coalition bargaining but also our 
understanding of the ability of presidents to influence legislatures more generally. 
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In theorizing the president’s role, it is helpful to return to the concepts of uncertainty and 
complexity both of which can be influenced by presidents. Presidents are an additional 
politically relevant actor that is involved in government formation and their preferences may 
not always be clear; some scholars contend that presidents act in the national interest while 
others argue that presidents are partisan actors (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Grossman & 
Sauger, 2009; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Tavits, 2008). However, if we begin from the premise 
that presidents have two basic motivations that are contingent on one another, (1) to remain in 
office and (2) to fulfil the policy preferences of their voters (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; 
Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b), then we can build a theory of presidential activism in 
coalition bargaining. To pre-empt the ensuing discussion, it is my contention that greater 
constitutional powers reduce complexity and the president’s partisanship reduces both 
uncertainty and complexity in the government formation process. Thus, leading to shorter 
government formation processes. 
 
Presidential powers, the legitimacy to act, and complexity 
 
A crucial part of a president’s legitimacy to intervene in government formation derives from 
their electoral mandate (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999). The president can claim direct authority 
from the electorate to act as a chief executive and interpret this as the legitimacy to influence 
cabinet formation. For example, in 2013, the Czech president Miloš Zeman refused to appoint 
the right-wing ruling coalition’s nominated candidate to replace outgoing prime minister Petr 
Nečas despite the coalition’s ability to command a parliamentary majority.3 No previous Czech 
president had refused to appoint a candidate for prime minister that held majority support in 
the legislature but until 2013, Czech presidents were not directly elected. Zeman was 
undoubtedly emboldened to act by his electoral mandate, stating that more people voted for 
him than any party (The Economist, 2013). In what follows, it is assumed that indirectly 
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presidents lack the legitimacy to intervene in the political process in such a way. All hypotheses 
are therefore dependent on this distinction and apply only to directly-elected presidents. 
 
However, the fact of being directly elected is insufficient to explain a president’s influence over 
government formation. The scenario in the Czech Republic could not have arisen in Bulgaria or 
Ireland where presidents are constitutionally proscribed from rejecting a proposed candidate 
for prime minister. Therefore, the president’s legitimacy to act also partly derives from their 
constitutional powers which enhances their authority in the eyes of both voters and other 
political actors in the system. 
 
Researchers whose focus is regime classification have sought to measure the constitutional 
powers of presidents in semi-presidential systems. The most commonly-used of these 
classifications is that of Shugart and Carey (1992) which was subsequently revised by Metcalf 
(2000). Under this schema, each constitutional power is rated on a scale of 0 to 4 then summed 
to produce an aggregate score of presidential powers in each country. Regarding the specific 
power of cabinet formation, a score of zero indicates that the president cannot appoint a prime 
minister or any other ministers unless they are recommended by the legislature. A score of 4 is 
given when the president can appoint a cabinet without the need for confirmation or investiture 
by the legislature. The most commonly-awarded score in empirical analyses is 1 which signifies 
that a president can name a prime minister who requires investiture and who can then name 
other ministers (Shugart & Carey, 1992). Other powers included in these schemas can also be of 
relevance to the government formation process, such as the power to dissolve the legislature or 
directly appoint ministers.4  
 
Constitutional provisions represent the formal powers available to a president but they do not 
reveal the extent of the president’s potential influence over the government formation process. 
Some presidents are more willing and able to use these powers or interpret their scope more 
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widely. For example, the period between 1991 and 1995 in Poland witnessed a great deal of 
government instability and a number of difficult government formation processes owing largely 
to president Lech Wałęsa’s ongoing disputes with a number of the parties that emerged from 
the break-up of the Solidarity movement and his willingness to interpret constitutional 
provisions in a way that privileged his office (Millard, 2000). Wałęsa was partially emboldened 
to do this by his personal stature as much as the powers of his office; he was the leader of the 
movement that overthrew the communist regime so how could anybody question his 
democratic credentials? The Finnish president, Urho Kekkonen was willing to go even further, 
exercising almost direct control over the appointment of prime ministers, the formation of 
coalitions, and the dismissal of governments (Nousiainen, 2001). Presidential influence can, 
then, extend beyond the scope of their constitutional powers. By contrast, Austrian presidents 
have extensive formal powers over government formation but by convention they are rarely 
exercised, leading Samuels and Shugart (2010) to label Austria as a “parliamentarized” semi-
presidential regime. 
 
Referring specifically to the coalition bargaining process, it is expected that presidents with 
greater powers will reduce the complexity of government formation. This is achieved by placing 
limits on what constitutes an acceptable governing proposal to politically relevant actors in the 
bargaining process. These limits can derive from either the president’s legislative or non-
legislative powers (Metcalf, 2000; Shugart & Carey, 1992). Non-legislative powers allow the 
president to directly intervene in coalition formation by, for example, being able to appoint the 
formateur. The formateur then has an agenda-setting role which can bias the outcome of 
negotiations in the president’s favor (Baron & Ferejohn, 1989). However, this power may be 
constrained by conventions, such as the requirement to give the leader of the largest party the 
first attempt to form a government. Alternatively, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009a) have 
shown that where presidents have the power to dissolve the legislature, the risk of cabinet 
termination is higher. It could, then, be expected that in systems where the president has the 
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power to dismiss the cabinet or dissolve the legislature, parties with rational foresight have an 
incentive to form a government more in line with the president’s preferences in order to reduce 
the prospect of cabinet instability (Protsyk, 2006). Whenever a president has greater powers to 
directly intervene in either cabinet formation or dismissal, the range of acceptable governments 
will be reduced to the set that will not induce the president to use these powers. As such, 
bargaining complexity will be lower. 
 
Presidents with stronger legislative powers will also reduce the complexity of coalition 
bargaining. To understand how, it must be recalled that presidents in semi-presidential systems 
are co-executive actors; any cabinet that forms will govern alongside the president and both the 
president and cabinet will attempt to satisfy the policy preferences of their voters to enhance 
their chances of being re-elected. Parties, as actors with rational foresight, understand this and 
will factor it into their calculations of what constitutes an acceptable governing offer. Presidents 
with greater legislative powers have the ability to veto or delay legislation in an attempt to push 
policy towards their own preferences as was the case in France during the period of 
cohabitation under president François Mitterand between 1986 and 1988 (Elgie & McMenamin, 
2011; Köker, 2014). Presidents can also be generally disruptive to the government by 
interpreting their legislative powers as the ability to influence policy outputs as is the case in 
France (Grossman & Sauger, 2009; Metcalf, 2000). More extensive legislative powers are 
therefore likely to lead to greater conflict between the president and government if the cabinet 
is not considered to be acceptable to the president (Protsyk, 2005a, 2006; Roper, 2002). In that 
situation, the costs of taking office for parties can outweigh the benefits as the potential to fulfil 
their legislative agenda is limited which will have consequences at the ballot box.  
 
In sum, when the president has greater powers, the set of acceptable governing proposals is 
narrower. The government that forms must be one that is more likely to be stable and able to 
implement its legislative agenda. This limits the range of acceptable governments to those that 
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the president will not seek to prevent forming in the first place, or to directly destabilise, and 
those whose legislative agenda the president will not try to impede. Conversely, when 
presidents are weaker, parties have less incentive to consider their potential use of either 
legislative or non-legislative powers. Parties would also have a greater incentive to resist any 
presidential interference in the government formation process as they know that even if 
formation is delayed by this, the president will have little influence once the cabinet takes office 
due to their limited powers. The duration of coalition bargaining is therefore more likely to be 
influenced by factors other than the president in such circumstances. The actual constellation of 
presidential powers in each system varies with some holding greater legislative powers and 
some greater non-legislative powers. As the foregoing discussion shows, the net result will be 
similar for presidents with stronger legislative or non-legislative powers, meaning that the two 
are substitutable. They are also additive, as specified by the construction of the Shugart and 
Carey index (Shugart & Carey, 1992); presidents that hold both extensive legislative and non-
legislative powers should be more influential than those that hold only one or the other. 
Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The duration of government formation will be shorter in semi-presidential 
systems in which presidents have greater constitutional powers. 
 
Partisanship, complexity, and uncertainty 
 
Scholarship on presidential influence is often divided on how to characterize the president’s 
partisan preferences. Research into formateur and prime minister selection has found that 
presidents tend to appoint candidates who are ideologically proximate to them (Carroll & Cox, 
2011; Glasgow et al., 2011; Kang, 2009; Protsyk, 2005b). However, conventions surrounding 
formateur selection usually prevent them from exercising free choice in appointing a candidate. 
Studies of ministerial appointments offer a different conceptualization of the partisan 
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motivations of the president. They use the share of non-partisan ministers as the indicator of 
presidential influence, thus explicitly advancing the view that the president is above party 
politics and acts, instead, in the national interest or their own self-interest (Amorim Neto & 
Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; Tavits, 2008). This rests on the belief that the 
interests of the president and either the legislature, or a single political party, are not congruent. 
It is argued that the presidential mandate is national and they need to build electoral coalitions 
across party lines to win office so they see themselves as representatives of the mass of the 
people rather than a narrow party base (Tavits, 2008). The mandate of legislative parties is 
usually much more localized to an electoral district and parties can afford to appeal to a less 
diverse electorate and still perform well at the ballot box (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). As 
Schleiter and Morgan Jones (2010) put it, the preferences of the median voter of the president’s 
national constituency are likely to differ from those of the median voter in the constituency of 
the president’s party. 
 
 Samuels and Shugart (2010) and Grossman and Sauger (2009), have offered an alternative 
perspective. They argue that there is an increasing overlap between the preferences of 
presidents and their parties in the legislature, partly attributable to the “presidentialization” of 
political parties. This entails parties delegating authority to set electoral and governing 
strategies to their presidential candidates (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Grossman and Sauger 
(2009) show that this results in presidents behaving in a partisan manner and intervening more 
frequently in policy matters. It enables presidents to become “super prime ministers” at the cost 
of their ability to act as neutral arbiters of the constitution. 
 
There are substantial incentives for a president to act in a partisan fashion, particularly when 
parties are presidentialized and the presidential candidate can set the agenda for the party. For 
one, the president requires party resources to compete in elections. Funds and party members 
to provide local-level campaigning teams are usually in short supply to independent candidates 
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but parties have greater access to both. Although some independent candidates have won 
elections in semi-presidential systems, most have done so with the explicit support of a party; in 
fact, many presidents, by convention, become nominally independent upon assuming office to 
maintain the façade of a “representative of the nation”. A further incentive is provided by the 
enhanced support that a legislative base provides to a president. This legislative base increases 
the likelihood that a president can fulfil the policy preferences of their voters by giving them 
greater influence over legislative processes. The legislative party can also use administrative 
resources which are necessary to draft or oppose legislation but which are sometimes 
unavailable to presidents, as is the case in France (Grossman & Sauger, 2009). 
 
The presidentialization of parties has logical implications for the duration of government 
formation. If the preferences of presidents and their parties overlap then it can reduce overall 
uncertainty in the bargaining environment as other actors can infer the president’s position 
from those of their party, and vice versa. What constitutes an acceptable proposal for one is also 
acceptable to the other. But while the preferences of the president and their party may be 
overlapping, this simplifies coalition bargaining only to a limited degree. The bargaining 
environment may still be highly fragmented, polarized, or complex in other ways.  
 
If we build on the presidentialization thesis and assume presidents will prefer to see their party 
succeed, it can be argued that a president is more likely to see a governing proposal that 
includes their party as acceptable than an alternative that excludes their party. Indeed, all 
rationally foresighted parties in the system are also likely to concede that such a proposal is 
more sustainable if it avoids a period of cohabitation that is likely to be conflictual (Protsyk, 
2006). Cohabitation is defined as the scenario in which the president and prime minister are 
from different parties and the president’s party is not in the cabinet (Elgie, 2010; Elgie & 
McMenamin, 2011; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Periods of cohabitation, such as 1986-1988, 
1993-1995, and 1997-2002 in France and 1986-1995 in Portugal, are generally unstable as they 
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increase the potential for conflict over the direction of government policy as well as the exercise 
of constitutional powers (Amorim Neto & Lobo, 2009; Grossman & Sauger, 2009; Lazardeux, 
2015).5 Even in systems where presidents have weak legislative powers, they can still 
effectively impede the cabinet’s legislative agenda. Amorim Neto and Lobo (2009) have shown 
that Portuguese presidents have used ‘open presidencies’ as a tactic to set the legislative agenda 
by building public support for their policies.6 Pre-empting the type of conflict that arises from 
cohabitation is therefore an important consideration during government formation.  
 
It follows that the complexity of government formation will be lower when the president’s party 
holds a more powerful bargaining position and is therefore more likely to be included in the 
cabinet. The president and their party are politically relevant actors in the bargaining process, 
with the president possessing the potential to be disruptive in both the government formation 
process and post-formation governance. Other actors in the bargaining process know that an 
acceptable proposal is likely to be one that satisfies the preferences of the president and their 
party. Therefore, when the president’s party is a member of a greater proportion of potential 
cabinets the range of acceptable governing proposals is easily identifiable and the duration of 
bargaining will be shorter. Conversely, when the bargaining power of the president’s party is 
lower there are a greater proportion of minimal winning coalitions that do not contain the 
president’s party. Therefore, it is less likely that a viable cabinet containing the president’s party 
can be found. This, in turn, raises overall bargaining complexity as the president still must be 
satisfied with the governing proposal but has less incentive to accept a cabinet that does not 
contain their own party. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In semi-presidential systems, the duration of government formation will be 
shorter as the bargaining power of the president’s party in the legislature increases. 
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The hypotheses specified in this article assess two different aspects of presidential influence. 
First, presidential powers are a relatively static conduit for presidential influence on the 
bargaining process. While there have been changes in the constitutional powers of presidents 
over time, such is in Finland in 2000 and Poland in 1997, these are rare, so the powers of 
presidents vary little over time within countries.7 Second, and by contrast, the bargaining power 
of the president’s party is much more variable over time, changing at almost every 
parliamentary election. Assessing both static and variable channels of presidential influence in 
this way produces a more complete account of how presidents effect the government formation 
process. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
I test these hypotheses using data from 26 European countries. The data are taken from the 
European Representative Democracy Data Archive (ERDDA) (Andersson et al., 2014) and covers 
the period from 1945 (or the onset of democracy) to 2011. 12 countries are identified as semi-
presidential regimes according to Elgie’s (1999) commonly-used definition, meaning that there 
is a directly elected president and a cabinet that is responsible to parliament.8 This is chosen 
over Duverger’s (1980) classic definition as the criterion that the president must also possess 
considerable powers is considered to be too open to interpretation, thus making it more 
contentious to operationally define. Countries in which the president is elected by the assembly 
may also be considered semi-presidential by some definitions (Tavits, 2008) but the logic of my 
argument rests partially on the popular electoral mandate of a president.  
 
In total, there are 565 cabinet formation processes in the dataset. However, this full sample is 
used only to test the simple effect of semi-presidentialism. The hypotheses that I have specified 
refer specifically to the effect of semi-presidentialism conditional on presidential powers and 
the bargaining power of the president’s party. It is therefore more appropriate to exclude 
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countries from the analysis which have a monarchical head of state who is constitutionally 
bound to be apolitical. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of countries which have directly 
and indirectly-elected presidential heads of state, giving a total of 364 cases of cabinet 
formation processes. 
 
The dependent variable is the duration of the cabinet formation process in days. This is 
measured from the date of the end of the previous government to the date that the new 
government takes office or passes a vote of investiture in the legislature. The end of the 
previous government occurs when a general election is held, the party composition of the 
cabinet changes, or the prime minister resigns. Diermeier and Van Roozendaal (1998) and 
Golder (2010) both highlight the distinction between the length of the bargaining process as a 
whole and the duration of a discrete round of bargaining that may or may not produce a viable 
cabinet. In this research, I specifically address the duration of the whole bargaining process as I 
am concerned with explaining the length of time it takes to form a cabinet that successfully 
takes office which I believe is of greater substantive interest. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
accurately identify when individual bargaining rounds may begin or end, particularly as 
informal negotiations between actors often take place. Attempting to observe discrete rounds of 
negotiations is therefore likely to produce a lot of noise in the data. 
 
I have added three variables to the dataset to test my hypotheses. The first is an indicator which 
takes a value of 1 if there is a directly elected president in a country and 0 if there is some other 
type of head of state. This variable is coded per the Elgie definition set out above. The second is 
a measure of presidents’ constitutional powers. I use Metcalf’s (2000) revision of Shugart and 
Carey’s (1992) index of presidential powers with the data taken from Tavits (2008). This is 
technically an additive ordinal index however, as already discussed, the precise powers of the 
president are substitutable and it is my contention that the president’s authority and legitimacy 
to act increases along with the sum of their overall powers. As such, this index can serve as an 
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interval measure of presidential powers as it has been used in prior research (e.g. Amorim Neto 
& Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; Tavits, 2008). However, in the analysis I also 
run additional models using the sub-indices of legislative and non-legislative powers to add 
granularity to the discussion.  The third variable is used to examine the bargaining power of the 
president’s party which is an indicator of how likely it is to be included in a governing proposal. 
To measure this, I use the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) which provides an estimate of the number 
of times an actor is pivotal in a coalition, meaning that the actor turns a losing coalition into a 
winning coalition (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). The SSI is a commonly-used measure of bargaining 
power in weighted voting scenarios (e.g. Laver & Benoit, 2003; Pedersen, 2010; Warwick & 
Druckman, 2006). The index runs from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater bargaining 
power.9 The party affiliation of the president is collected from various archival sources 
including the European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook’s and the European 
Election Database.10  
 
Several control variables are added to the models to take into account the findings from 
previous research. If the bargaining process takes place following an election, it is assumed that 
uncertainty will be higher as party leaders have less information regarding what is an 
acceptable proposition to one another. Uncertainty may be reduced during a parliamentary 
term as day-to-day interaction in the legislature will reveal more about each party’s 
preferences. I therefore include a binary indicator of whether the bargaining process takes place 
after an election (1) or during a parliamentary term (0) with the expectation that post-election 
bargaining will be longer. Following previous research (Diermeier & van Roozendaal, 1998; 
Golder, 2010; Martin & Vanberg, 2003), two measures of bargaining environment complexity 
are included in the analysis. The first is the effective number of parliamentary parties. A more 
fragmented legislature should theoretically make it more difficult to form a government with a 
greater number of players in the bargaining process. The effective number of parties is 
calculated according to Laasko and Taagepera’s (1979) formula. The second measure is the 
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ideological polarization of the legislature. Golder (2010) argues that higher levels of 
polarization in the legislature increases the likelihood that a formateur will have to bargain with 
one or more parties that hold divergent preferences over a range of policy areas. The 
polarization measure used in this research is based on data from the Manifesto Project Database 
and is taken directly from the ERDDA dataset. 
 
Institutional rules can also influence bargaining duration. In countries where a constructive 
vote of no-confidence is in operation it is required that the legislature has an alternative 
government ready to take office at the same time that the vote of no-confidence is passed thus 
leading to a curtailed government formation process. I control for this by including a variable 
which has a value of 1 for those countries that use a constructive vote of no-confidence and 0 for 
countries that do not. In some countries, the incumbent government is not required to leave 
office immediately and is instead given the first opportunity to try and form a new government. 
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) state that this “continuation rule” should reduce the time 
taken to select a formateur and it allows the incumbent cabinet to start negotiations while still 
in office. Countries that operate a continuation rule are coded 1 in the dataset and all others 
coded 0. Previous research has included the need for a cabinet to pass an investiture vote in 
models of the duration of government formation. However, Golder (2010) argues that a more 
theoretically compelling distinction is that between formation processes characterized by 
positive parliamentarism and those characterized by negative parliamentarism. Under positive 
parliamentarism cabinets must obtain the support of a legislative majority to take office but 
under negative parliamentarism the cabinet must only ensure that a parliamentary majority 
does not vote against the cabinet. Government formation should therefore be shorter under 
negative parliamentarism. Countries are coded 1 where positive parliamentarism is present and 
0 where negative parliamentarism prevails. 
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A final control variable is the occurrence of a majority situation in parliament. One would expect 
that when a single party controls a legislative majority on its own then government formation 
would be more straightforward. However, as Golder (2010) notes, this does not mean a single 
party majority government is inevitable; surplus majority governments are not uncommon. 
Furthermore, even when a single party does take office, there may be some time before 
ministerial portfolios are allocated within the party. A majority situation in the cabinet 
formation process is coded 1; the absence of a majority situation is coded 0. Descriptive 
statistics for all variables can be found in the appendix. 
 
Method 
 
As the dependent variable in this research is the duration of the cabinet formation process, a 
survival time model is the most appropriate mode of assessment. I use a semi-parametric Cox 
proportional hazards model which does not require researchers to make any assumptions 
about the baseline hazard function. It is therefore less demanding of the data than parametric 
models. The Cox model provides estimates for covariates but not directly for the baseline 
hazard function, h0(t), although both a survivor and cumulative hazard function can be 
recovered. The general model used in this research is specified as: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp(𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚
+ 𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑋 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑋 𝑆𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑋 𝑆𝑆𝐼) 
 
 
All models are estimated using robust standard errors (Lin & Wei, 1989). All government 
formation processes in this dataset end in the formation of a cabinet so there is no need to 
censor the data. Tests of the proportional hazards assumption using scaled Schoenfeld residuals 
show evidence of non-proportionality in every model in Table 1, indicating that the effect of 
some variables on the hazard rate varies over time. I use the most common solution for 
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violations of the proportional hazards assumption which is to interact the offending variables 
with the natural logarithm of the dependent variable (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001). 
 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean duration of the government formation process by country. Average 
duration varies considerably between countries, from just over five days in France and Greece 
up to 82 days in the Netherlands. Distinct patterns between regimes are not immediately clear 
though on average, government formation takes three days longer in semi-presidential systems. 
While average government formation time is not vastly different between semi-presidential and 
other regimes, it is noticeable that the standard deviation for semi-presidential systems is lower 
indicating that there is a greater spread of the data in parliamentary systems.11 Furthermore, 
the maximum duration of government formation in semi-presidential systems in this data is 176 
days compared to 272 days in parliamentary systems.  
 
Figure 2 gives a clearer picture of the differences in government formation times between 
regimes. The hazard estimate in this instance is the likelihood of the government formation 
process concluding successfully on a given day. In semi-presidential regimes there is a much 
greater likelihood that government formation will end earlier in the bargaining process with a 
distinct increase in the hazard estimate between approximately 45 and 80 days compared to 
parliamentary regimes. There is also a noticeably longer tail to the hazard estimate of the 
government formation process in parliamentary systems which indicates there is a greater 
number of cases of prolonged coalition bargaining compared to semi-presidential regimes. The 
descriptive statistics therefore indicate that we can expect the cabinet formation process to be 
shorter in duration in semi-presidential regimes though only a more rigorous test of the data 
can tell us whether these differences between systems are important. 
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Figure 1. The duration of government formation in parliamentary and semi-presidential and 
political systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Smoothed hazard estimate of the duration of government formation by type of 
political system. 
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Table 1 contains the results of the proportional hazards models of cabinet bargaining duration. 
The entries in the table are hazard ratios which can be interpreted as the odds that cabinet 
bargaining will end on a given day.12 Hazard ratios are assessed relative to a baseline of 1; 
values greater than 1 indicate an increased likelihood that bargaining will end and values of less 
than 1 suggest a decreased likelihood that government formation will conclude. 
 
Model one estimates the effect of semi-presidentialism on the duration of government 
formation without the inclusion of the other specified independent variables. This is to establish 
the unconditional effect of semi-presidentialism for the full dataset which includes systems with 
a monarchical head of state. The results show that the government formation process is likely to 
end earlier in semi-presidential systems. The hazard ratio of 1.72 indicates that the likelihood 
that government formation will end on a given day is increased by 72 percent in semi-
presidential systems. This result is important, but the more substantively interesting questions 
are how and when are presidents influential? When the presidential powers and SSI (bargaining 
power of the president’s party) variables are added to the equation in model two the effect of 
semi-presidentialism is reduced; though it should also be noted that systems with monarchical 
heads of state are removed from these models including the Netherlands and Belgium which 
generally have longer government formation processes. While still indicating that government 
formation time is shorter in semi-presidential systems, the hazard ratio of this variable is now 
1.31 and it is no longer statistically significant. However, both presidential powers and SSI are 
significant and associated with shorter government formation processes with hazard ratios of 
1.05 and 2.13 respectively. These results indicate that semi-presidentialism alone is not enough 
to produce significantly shorter coalition bargaining periods. Instead, model two suggests that 
the effect of semi-presidentialism is conditional on other factors. 
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Table 1: Cox proportional hazards models of the duration of the government formation process 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) 
        
Semi presidential 1.724*** 1.313 0.287*** 0.555* 0.238* 0.380 1.175 
 (0.202) (0.201) (0.101) (0.127) (0.162) (0.209) (0.248) 
Pres powers  1.054* 0.919   0.905 1.048* 
  (0.024) (0.041)   (0.086) (0.023) 
SSI  2.131** 0.533 0.550 0.631 1.911** 0.730 
  (0.494) (0.249) (0.262) (0.296) (0.450) (0.338) 
Post-election 0.286*** 0.152*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.141*** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
ENP 0.889* 0.888 0.887 0.906 0.874* 0.884 0.845* 
 (0.041) (0.058) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) 
Polarization 1.008 1.007 1.007 1.009 1.006 1.005 1.011 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constructive no-confidence 1.389* 1.704*** 1.771*** 1.815*** 1.557** 1.719*** 1.683** 
 (0.204) (0.253) (0.253) (0.260) (0.225) (0.254) (0.269) 
Positive parl. 1.278 0.999 0.995 0.809 1.133 0.982 1.016 
 (0.167) (0.181) (0.185) (0.146) (0.256) (0.177) (0.179) 
Majority situation 1.129 1.417 1.242 1.255 1.136 1.434 1.302 
 (0.174) (0.277) (0.249) (0.250) (0.235) (0.281) (0.251) 
Continuation 4.586***       
 (0.745)       
Semi pres X Pres powers   1.195***   1.242*  
   (0.063)   (0.125)  
Semi pres X SSI   6.457*** 5.835** 5.575**  3.694* 
   (3.558) (3.261) (3.019)  (2.000) 
Legislative powers    0.935    
    (0.043)    
Semi pres X Leg. powers    1.188**    
    (0.067)    
Non-legislative powers     0.732   
     (0.134)   
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Semi pres X Non-leg. powers     1.476   
     (0.295)   
Post-election X ln(Time) 1.077* 1.359*** 1.350*** 1.354*** 1.353*** 1.383*** 1.390*** 
 (0.037) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.090) (0.098) (0.096) 
ENP X ln(Time) 1.005 1.021 1.014 1.015 1.017 1.021 1.039* 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Semi pres X ln(Time)      1.111 0.819*** 
      (0.182) (0.041) 
Pres power X ln(Time)      1.012  
      (0.029)  
Semi pres X Pres powers X 
ln(time) 
     0.974  
      (0.030)  
SSI X ln(Time)       0.826 
       (0.097) 
Semi pres X SSI X ln(Time)       1.514** 
       (0.199) 
N 565 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Log-likelihood -2888.938 -1695.876 -1684.775 -1686.237 -1689.028 -1685.948 -1682.204 
AIC 5797.877 3413.751 3395.550 3398.473 3404.055 3401.897 3394.408 
BIC 5841.245 3456.620 3446.213 3449.136 3454.718 3460.354 3452.866 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Entries in the table are hazard ratios (HR) with standard errors in parentheses. 
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To test the conditional effect of semi-presidentialism I specified two hypotheses. The first states 
that the government formation process would be shorter in systems where presidents have 
more constitutional power. The direct election of the president provides a foundation of 
legitimacy for them to intervene in the government formation process but this is augmented by 
their constitutional powers. These powers increase the authority and status of the president in 
the eyes of the electorate and other political actors. The interaction term semi-pres. X pres. 
powers in model three shows that where presidents are both powerful and directly elected, the 
likelihood that cabinet formation will end on a given day is increased by 20 percent. This result 
allows me to confirm hypothesis one (H1). Although tests of the proportional hazard 
assumption did not suggest that this conditional effect varies over time, I specified a further 
model to test this. Model six shows the result of a three-way interaction, semi pres X pres powers 
X ln(Time). The coefficient is not statistically significant but the hazard ratio does indicate that 
the effect of powerful directly-elected presidents declines over time. 
 
Returning to the main result of model three, the effect of increasing presidential powers is more 
clearly illustrated in Figure 3. This shows the simulated marginal effect on the hazard ratio of 
semi-presidentialism compared to parliamentary regimes, at different levels of presidential 
powers. Using simulations allows researchers to produce estimates of the uncertainty of 
quantities of interest, in this case, the marginal effect. Darker areas of the graph show the 
central 50 percent of simulations, lighter areas the remainder, and the dark line is the median 
value. All simulations are carried out using the simPH package in R (Gandrud, 2015).13  Figure 3 
shows that the effect of semi-presidentialism increases as the president’s constitutional powers 
increase. At the lowest level of presidential powers in this dataset which is a score of 2, the 
effect of semi-presidentialism on the hazard ratio is an increase of just 0.5 (50 percentage 
points). However, the marginal effect of directly-elected presidents that receive a score of 8 or 
above on the presidential powers index is an increase in the hazard ratio of at least 1.2 (120 
percentage points), rising to 3 at the highest level of presidential powers (13). Approximately 
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44 percent of semi-presidential cases in this dataset receive a score of 8 or greater on the 
presidential powers index compared to just 3 percent of cases with indirectly elected 
presidents. These results provide further detail to the confirmation of H1. 
 
  
Figure 3: Simulated marginal effect of semi-presidentialism conditional on presidential powers. 
Note: Results are taken from model three of Table 1. Graph is based on 1,000 simulations. 
 
The discussion of the first hypothesis suggested two causal mechanisms that could lead to 
reduced government formation time when presidents are more powerful. The first indicated 
that some presidents could directly intervene in the bargaining process using their non-
legislative powers. The second outlined how rationally foresighted parties would act to propose 
a cabinet that is more likely to be able to fulfil its legislative agenda without interference from a 
president with strong legislative powers. I test separately the effect of legislative and non-
legislative powers in models four and five. The interaction terms semi pres X leg powers and semi 
pres X non-leg powers both show that presidents with either greater legislative or non-
legislative powers reduce the duration of the government formation process. The effect just fails 
to reach the conventional level of statistical significance in the case of semi pres X non-leg powers 
(p=0.052). However, this is evidence that legislative and non-legislative powers are, to some 
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extent, substitutable in explaining the influence of presidents on the duration of government 
formation. Though the evidence of the effect of presidents’ aggregate constitutional powers is 
more emphatic. 
 
 
Figure 4: Simulated marginal effect of semi-presidentialism conditional on the bargaining power 
of the president’s party. 
Note: Results are taken from model three of Table 1. Graph is based on 1,000 simulations. 
 
Model three also tests the second hypothesis (H2) which states that government formation will 
be a smoother process when the president’s party holds a stronger bargaining position and is 
therefore more likely to be included in the proposed cabinet. The interaction term semi-pres X 
SSI is significant at the p<.001 level and the hazard ratio indicates that when the president’s 
party holds greater bargaining power, the likelihood that government formation will end earlier 
increases by over 600 percent. Poland provides a demonstration of this finding. The first 
government to form after the inauguration of the SLD president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was 
an SLD-PSL coalition that took just 12 days to negotiate in 1996. The SLD’s bargaining power 
was 0.41 on the SSI at the time, meaning that it was a pivotal player in around 41 percent of 
possible coalitions. Following the 1997 general election, the SLDs bargaining power was 
reduced to 0.22 and government formation lasted 40 days. As with H1, I specified a further 
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model to explore how the conditional effect of semi-presidentialism and the bargaining power 
of their party varies over time. Tests of the proportional hazards assumption did not suggest 
this would be the case. However, the result for semi pres X SSI X ln(Time) in model seven is 
statistically significant. It indicates that the hypothesized effect increases over time. It is 
uncertain why this is the case, though one could argue that the bargaining position of the 
president’s party will become stronger as time goes on and uncertainty about the preferences of 
the president and their party erodes. Other actors in the process begin to understand that an 
acceptable governing proposal will include the president’s party. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the conditional relationship between semi-presidentialism and the 
bargaining power of the president’s party in the legislature. The marginal effect of a semi-
presidential system compared to a parliamentary regime, and accompanying levels of 
uncertainty, are once again estimated via simulation. The marginal effect of semi-
presidentialism clearly increases along with the bargaining power of the president’s party so, as 
the party holds a stronger bargaining position in the legislature, the duration of government 
formation is reduced. There is, as may be expected, a greater level of uncertainty about this 
effect at the highest end of the bargaining power scale though even for cases above 0.75 on the 
SSI, the central 50 percent of simulations are relatively condensed as indicated by the dark 
ribbon in Figure 4. Overall, H2 is confirmed by the data which offers support for the argument 
that the partisanship of the president is important in semi-presidential regimes. This provides a 
challenge to those who argue that presidents are neutral arbiters of the constitution rather than 
party political actors. 
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Table 2: A posteriori model of the government formation process 
 (8) 
  
 HR/(SE) 
  
Semi-presidential 1.002 
 (0.192) 
Pres powers 1.046 
 (0.025) 
SSI 2.919*** 
 (0.781) 
Pres party in cabinet 0.568** 
 (0.103) 
Post-election 0.151*** 
 (0.033) 
ENP 0.882 
 (0.058) 
Polarization 1.009 
 (0.006) 
Constructive no-confidence 1.703*** 
 (0.272) 
Positive parl. 0.990 
 (0.180) 
Majority situation 1.298 
 (0.263) 
Semipres X Pres party in cabinet 1.632* 
 (0.363) 
Post-election X ln(Time) 1.346*** 
 (0.088) 
ENP X ln(Time) 1.017 
 (0.016) 
N 364 
Log-likelihood -1691.468 
AIC 3408.937 
BIC 3459.600 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Entries in the table are hazard ratios (HR) with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
To explore H2 further, I specified a model of the duration of coalition bargaining that includes 
whether the president’s party was included in the final cabinet. The model in Table 2 cannot be 
used for predictive purposes as the composition of the cabinet is not known a priori. However, it 
is still informative as it can help to explain bargaining duration a posteriori, though one should 
proceed with caution when drawing conclusions on the basis of this evidence as selection bias 
could be an issue whenever variables are used that are based on characteristics of the final 
cabinet (Golder, 2010). With that caveat in mind, the result for the interaction term semi pres X 
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pres party in the cabinet indicates that the duration of government formation is reduced when 
the president’s party is included in the final governing proposal. This adds further weight to the 
contention that the bargaining process is more straightforward, and duration reduced, when the 
president’s party holds greater prospects for success. 
 
Some of the control variables included in Table 1 are also worth highlighting. In accordance 
with the findings of previous literature, post-election cabinet formation processes are 
significantly longer than those that take place during a parliamentary term which lends weight 
to the uncertainty hypothesis of Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998). The complexity of the 
bargaining environment also appears to influence cabinet bargaining with more fragmented 
legislatures leading to longer formation processes as indicated by the ENP variable, though this 
is only significant in models one and five. However, the interactions of both post-election X 
ln(Time) and ENP X ln(Time) show that the influence of uncertainty and complexity declines 
over time as actors reveal more information about their bargaining positions and each becomes 
more aware of what is an acceptable cabinet proposal to other actors. The existence of a 
constructive vote of no-confidence serves to reduce the duration of government formation, 
increasing the likelihood that the process will end by around 77 percent on a given day (see 
model three). Finally, the presence of a continuation rule significantly reduces the duration of 
government formation though it should be noted that no semi-presidential regimes have such a 
rule.  
 
DO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES DRIVE THE RESULTS? 
 
The results in this article provide strong support for the argument that the president’s 
legitimacy to act and partisan politics produce shorter cabinet bargaining processes in semi-
presidential systems. But are these results driven by particular countries in which presidents 
have demonstrated greater willingness to intervene in government formation? Could they also 
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be influenced by certain parliamentary systems in which long bargaining periods are the norm? 
To test the robustness of the results I re-ran model three from Table 1, which is the specification 
that forms the basis for most of my conclusions, with certain countries excluded. 
 
Table 3: Robustness tests of the duration of the government formation process 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Exclude 
Austria 
Exclude 
France 
Exclude 
France and 
Finland 
Exclude 
Netherlands 
 HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) HR/(SE) 
     
Semi-presidential 0.394** 0.312** 0.317** 1.470** 
 (0.141) (0.113) (0.113) (0.209) 
Semi pres X Pres powers 1.149* 1.186** 1.177**  
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.062)  
Semi pres X SSI 7.106*** 6.144** 6.413**  
 (4.054) (3.586) (3.685)  
N 341 336 287 540 
Log-likelihood -1560.555 -1535.341 -1267.680 -2753.081 
AIC 3147.110 3096.682 2561.359 5526.162 
BIC 3196.924 3146.304 2608.933 5569.078 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note: Entries in the table are hazard ratios (HR) with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The results in Table 3 show only the hazard ratios for the variables of interest for the reduced 
samples though each model contains the full specification in table one.14 Model nine shows the 
results for the sample excluding Austria. The Austrian president is very powerful, possessing 
the right to unilaterally appoint the prime minister and dismiss the legislature. However, by 
convention, these powers are rarely exercised and Austria is therefore a heavily 
parliamentarized semi-presidential system (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Austria is also the semi-
presidential country with the longest average duration of government formation (see Figure 1) 
so the results should not be sensitive to its exclusion and we may even expect the substantive 
effect of the independent variables to increase which is precisely what happens in the case of 
semi pres. X SSI.  
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I then excluded France from the sample. France is perhaps the most studied case of semi-
presidentialism and is often seen as the European country with the most prominent president. 
One may therefore expect that France has the potential to unduly influence the results of this 
study. Model ten shows that this is not the case with all hazard ratios of interest remaining 
significant and in the expected direction when France is removed from the sample. Although De 
Winter and Dumont did not analyse the relationship between semi-presidentialism and the 
duration of government formation, they did include it as a control variable and attributed its 
effect to the influence of presidents in France and Finland (De Winter & Dumont, 2008, p 151). 
This is a reasonable assumption given the prominence of French presidents and the power 
wielded by Finnish presidents until around the late 1970s (Jih-Wen, 2011; Nousiainen, 2001). 
The results in model eleven show that my explanatory variables are not sensitive to the 
exclusion of both France and Finland from the sample. Finally, in model twelve I test whether 
the higher than average duration of government formation in one parliamentary regime – the 
Netherlands – influences the effect of the semi-presidential variable. Excluding the Netherlands 
from the sample sees the hazard ratio for this variable reduce from 1.72 in table one (model 
one) to 1.47 though it remains statistically significant. 
 
Overall, the results of this research are not driven by the inclusion of outlier countries in which 
presidents assume disproportionate influence over government formation. Instead, these tests 
show that presidential influence over the duration of government formation is a systemic 
feature of semi-presidential democracies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, I have examined the influence of presidents on the duration of government 
formation in semi-presidential democracies and shed light on the nature of executive-legislative 
relations in such systems. While it may have been expected that presidents, as prominent 
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political figures on both the domestic and international stages, would have some part to play 
during government formation, the literature to date has overlooked this and failed to offer a 
theoretical account of the president’s role. I build on the complexity and uncertainty models of 
previous literature to offer a new theoretical approach to understanding the effect of 
presidential intervention in the government formation process and the circumstances under 
which this influence is likely to be exercised. 
 
Presidential influence can be explained by a combination of the president’s legitimacy to act in 
government formation and partisan politics. The president’s legitimacy to act derives partly 
from their popular electoral mandate but it is conditional on the scale and scope of their 
constitutional powers which increases their authority in the eyes of voters and other political 
actors in the system. These powers may be non-legislative, allowing the president to directly 
intervene in government formation, or they may be legislative. Presidents with extensive 
legislative powers can impede a government’s legislative agenda and destabilize the cabinet. 
Thus, where presidents are more powerful the complexity of the bargaining process is reduced 
by limiting the range of governing proposals to those that will be considered more acceptable to 
the president, thus forestalling the need to exercise their powers.  
 
Together with the legitimacy to act, the president’s partisanship also reduces the duration of 
coalition bargaining. With the presidentialization of political parties the level of uncertainty in 
the bargaining process is lower as the preferences of the president and their party overlap. 
Presidents therefore have a major incentive to see their parties become part of the cabinet and 
thus limit the prospects of a conflictual cohabitation. This becomes increasing likely if the 
president’s party holds a stronger bargaining position in the legislature. As the bargaining 
power of the president’s party increases and it becomes a pivotal player in a greater proportion 
of potential cabinets. Bargaining becomes less complex as any viable cabinet will contain the 
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president’s party and is more likely to be acceptable to the president. Therefore, the 
partisanship of the president also results in a shorter government formation process. 
 
The empirical results provide support for this argument. Using a sample of European 
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies I show that the duration of the government 
formation process is significantly shorter in semi-presidential systems in which the president 
has greater constitutional powers, and when the president’s party has greater bargaining power 
in the government formation process. The duration of government formation is also shorter 
when the president’s party is included in the final cabinet. Robustness tests demonstrate that 
these results are not driven by potentially influential countries (e.g. France and Finland).  
 
These empirical results point to the systemic influence of semi-presidentialism on the duration 
of government formation. This study therefore adds to our understanding of what drives the 
bargaining process, augmenting the complexity and uncertainty driven explanations of previous 
research. Furthermore, the results here contribute to our understanding of the effects of semi-
presidentialism as a regime type. To date, research into the influence of presidents on 
government formation have focussed on ministerial appointments (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 
2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010), so this study represents the first research that 
concentrates on the bargaining process itself. Crucially, and in contrast to study of ministerial 
appointments, the results of this research show that presidents do act in a partisan manner in 
semi-presidential system as suggested by Samuels and Shugart (2010) and Grossman and 
Sauger (2009). More broadly, this research demonstrates that the extent of presidential 
influence in dual-executive systems extends beyond what the constitution may prescribe. This is 
particularly the case in terms of coalition bargaining and government formation.  
  
34 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
Variable 
ERDDA 
variable 
name Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bargaining duration (days) v600e 565 27.42 35.41 0.01 272 
Semi-presidential   565 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Presidential powers   365 7.03 2.93 2 13 
SSI   364 0.28 0.28 0 1 
Legislative powers   365 2.61 2.10 0 8 
Non-legislative powers   365 4.43 1.79 1 8 
Post-election v303e 565 0.55 0.50 0 1 
ENO v309e 565 3.91 1.35 1.99 10.47 
Polarization v407e 565 16.52 9.51 0.01 48.75 
Constructive no-confidence v508e 565 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Positive parl. v505e 565 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Majority situation v314e* 565 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Continuation   565 0.20 0.40 0 1 
* The coding of this variable has been inverted from the original coding in the ERDDA dataset to ease 
interpretation 
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3 Nečas had been removed from office following charges of corruption and abuse of power that were 
levelled at his chief of staff, Jana Nagyová. 
4 See Doyle and Elgie (2014) for a review of alternative indices of presidential power. 
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& Mashtaler, 2013). 
6 An ‘open presidency’ occurs when a president temporarily moves the seat of office to a different region 
in a kind of political tour. These gain a great deal of media attention, thus allowing the president greater 
capacity to frame political debate. 
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11 See the appendix for a table of descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
12 Standard errors in the tables are the errors of the exponentiated coefficients. Tables containing 
standard coefficients and accompanying standard errors are available from the author on request. 
13 For simulation methods for proportional hazards models in Stata see Licht (2011). 
14 The full tables are available in the supplementary information. 
